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Wealth Distributions in Models of Capital Exchange
S. Ispolatov, P. L. Krapivsky, and S. Redner
Center for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215
A dynamical model of capital exchange is introduced in which a specified amount of capital is
exchanged between two individuals when they meet. The resulting time dependent wealth distribu-
tions are determined for a variety of exchange rules. For “greedy” exchange, an interaction between
a rich and a poor individual results in the rich taking a specified amount of capital from the poor.
When this amount is independent of the capitals of the two traders, a mean-field analysis yields
a Fermi-like scaled wealth distribution in the long-time limit. This same distribution also arises
in greedier exchange processes, where the interaction rate is an increasing function of the capital
difference of the two traders. The wealth distribution in multiplicative processes, where the amount
of capital exchanged is a finite fraction of the capital of one of the traders, are also discussed. For
random multiplicative exchange, a steady state wealth distribution is reached, while in greedy mul-
tiplicative exchange a non-steady power law wealth distribution arises, in which the support of the
distribution continuously increases. Finally, extensions of our results to arbitrary spatial dimension
and to growth processes, where capital is created in an interaction, are presented.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ga, 05.70.Ln, 05.40.+j
I. INTRODUCTION
Economics underlies many of our day-to-day activi-
ties, and yet, remarkably, resists axiomatization and first-
principles explanations. However, the recent applications
of ideas developed in statistical physics, such as scaling,
self-organization, landscape paradigms, etc. may help
establish a conceptual framework for the scientific anal-
ysis of economic activities [1–4]. In this spirit of sim-
plicity and concreteness, we introduce capital exchange
models as an attempt to account for the wealth distri-
bution of a population. While there is considerable data
available on this phenomenon [5], there does not appear
to be a simple and causal explanation of the observed
distributions. The basis of our modeling is that the ele-
mental kernel of economic activity in a dynamic economy
is the interaction between two individuals which results
in the rearrangement of their capital. Through repeated
two-body interactions between pairs of traders, a global
wealth distribution develops and we wish to understand
how generic features of this distribution depend on the
nature of the two-body interaction.
Our models have the obvious shortcomings of being
oversimplified and on focusing on only one mechanism
among the myriad of factors that influence individual
wealth. Based on everyday experience, however, it may
be argued that at an elemental level much economic ac-
tivity is essentially the trading of capital between two
individuals. The potential utility of our models is that
they yield realistic wealth distributions for certain ex-
change rules, as well suggesting avenues for potentially
fruitful developments.
In the next section, we first treat “additive” processes
in which a fixed amount of capital is exchanged in an in-
teraction between two individuals, independent of their
initial capital [6]. While the restriction of fixed capital
is not realistic, the resulting models are soluble and pro-
vide a natural starting point for economically-motivated
generalizations. Within a (mean-field) rate equation de-
scription, we find that the wealth distribution generally
exhibits scaling, from which both the time dependence of
the average wealth and the shape of the scaled wealth dis-
tribution can be obtained. As a preliminary, we give an
exact solution for random exchange, where either trader
is equally likely to profit in an interaction. The scaling
approach is then applied to “greedy” exchange, in which
the richer person always wins in an interaction. For this
system, the resulting wealth distribution closely resem-
bles the occupancy distribution of an ideal Fermi gas.
We next consider “multiplicative” processes in Sec. III,
in which the amount of capital exchanged is a fixed frac-
tion of the current capital of one of the traders. The mo-
tivation for this model is the observation that fractional
exchange typically underlies many economic transactions
– for example, a loan at the end of its repayment period.
For a broad range of model parameters, realistic forms
of the wealth distribution result. In the interesting case
of greedy multiplicative exchange, the distribution is a
power with a cutoff at small wealth that decays exponen-
tially in time and a large wealth cutoff that grows linearly.
In Sec. IV, we then discuss the behavior of our wealth ex-
change models in arbitrary spatial dimension, when dif-
fusion is the transport mechanism which brings trading
partners together. As might be anticipated, when the
spatial dimension d < 2, dimension-dependent behavior
is found for the time evolution of the wealth distribution.
Finally, in Sec. V, we summarize and also briefly men-
tion a toy model for economic growth in which capital is
produced in an elemental two-body interaction. The re-
lation between capital production and capital conserving
models are also outlined.
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II. ADDITIVE CAPITAL EXCHANGE
Consider a population of traders, each of which pos-
sesses a certain amount of capital which is assumed to be
quantized in units of minimal capital. Taking this latter
quantity as the basic unit, the fortune of an individual is
restricted to the integers. The wealth of the population
evolves by the repeated interaction of random pairs of
traders. In each interaction, one unit of capital is trans-
ferred between the trading partners. To complete the
description, we specify that if a poorest individual (with
one unit of capital) loses all remaining capital by virtue
of a “loss”, the bankrupt individual is considered to be
economically dead and no longer participates in economic
activity.
In the following subsections, we consider three spe-
cific realizations of additive capital exchange. In “ran-
dom” exchange, the direction of the capital exchange is
independent of the relative capital of the traders. While
this rule has little economic basis, the resulting model
is completely soluble and thus provides a helpful peda-
gogical starting point. We next consider “greedy” ex-
change in which a richer person takes one unit of cap-
ital from a poorer person in a trade. Such a rule is a
reasonable starting point for describing exploitive eco-
nomic activity. Finally, we consider a more heartless ver-
sion – “very greedy” exchange – in which the rate of
exchange is proportional to the difference in capital be-
tween the two interacting individuals. These latter two
cases can be solved by a scaling approach. The primary
result is that the scaled wealth distribution resembles a
finite-temperature Fermi distribution, with an effective
temperature that goes to zero in the long-time limit.
A. Random Exchange
In this process, one unit of capital is exchanged be-
tween trading partners, as represented by the reaction
scheme (j, k) → (j ± 1, k ∓ 1). Let ck(t) be the den-
sity of individuals with capital k. Within a mean-field
description, ck(t) evolves according to
dck(t)
dt
= N(t) [ck+1(t) + ck−1(t)− 2ck(t)] , (1)
with N(t) ≡M0(t) =
∑
∞
k=1 ck(t) the population density.
The first two terms account for the gain in ck(t) due to
the interactions (j, k + 1) → (j + 1, k) and (j, k − 1) →
(j−1, k), respectively, while the last term accounts for the
loss in ck(t) due to the interactions (j, k)→ (j±1, k∓1)
By defining a modified time variable,
T =
∫ t
0
dt′N(t′), (2)
Eq. (1) is reduced to the discrete diffusion equation
dck(T )
dT
= ck+1(T ) + ck−1(T )− 2ck(T ). (3)
The rate equation for the poorest density has the slightly
different form, dc1/dT = c2 − 2c1, but may be written
in the same form as Eq. (3) if we impose the boundary
condition c0(T ) = 0.
Eq. (3) may be readily solved for arbitrary initial
conditions [7]. For illustrative purposes, let us assume
that initially all individuals have one unit of capital,
ck(0) = δk1. The solution to Eq. (3) subject to these
initial and boundary conditions is
ck(T ) = e
−2T [Ik−1(2T )− Ik+1(2T )] , (4)
where In denotes the modified Bessel function of order n
[8]. Consequently, the total density N(T ) is
N(T ) = e−2T [I0(2T ) + I1(2T )] . (5)
To re-express this exact solution in terms of the phys-
ical time t, we first invert Eq. (2) to obtain t(T ) =∫ T
0
dT ′/N(T ′), and then eliminate T in favor of t in the
solution for ck(T ). For simplicity and concreteness, let
us consider the long-time limit. From Eq. (4),
ck(T ) ≃ k√
4πT 3
exp
(
− k
2
4T
)
, (6)
and from Eq. (5),
N(T ) ≃ (πT )−1/2. (7)
Eq. (7) also implies t ≃ 23
√
πT 3 which gives
N(t) ≃
(
2
3πt
)1/3
, (8)
and
ck(t) ≃ k
3t
exp
[
−
( π
144
)1/3 k2
t2/3
]
. (9)
Note that this latter expression may be written in the
scaling form ck(t) ∝ N2x e−x2 , with the scaling vari-
able x ∝ kN . One can also confirm that the scaling
solution represents the basin of attraction for almost all
exact solutions. Indeed, for any initial condition with
ck(0) decaying faster than k
−2, the system reaches the
scaling limit ck(t) ∝ N2x e−x2 . On the other hand, if
ck(0) ∼ k−1−α, with 0 < α < 1, such an initial state con-
verges to an alternative scaling limit which depends on
α, as discussed, e. g., in Ref. [9]. These solutions exhibit
a slower decay of the total density, N ∼ t−α/(1+α), while
the scaling form of the wealth distribution is
ck(t) ∼ N2/αCα(x), x ∝ kN1/α, (10)
with the scaling function
2
Cα(x) = e−x2
∫
∞
0
du
e−u
2
sinh(2ux)
u1+α
. (11)
Evaluating the integral by the Laplace method gives an
asymptotic distribution which exhibits the same x−1−α
as the initial distribution. This anomalous scaling in the
solution to the diffusion equation is a direct consequence
of the extended initial condition. This latter case is not
physically relevant, however, since the extended initial
distribution leads to a divergent initial wealth density.
B. Greedy Exchange
In greedy exchange, when two individuals meet, the
richer person takes one unit of capital from the poorer
person, as represented by the reaction scheme (j, k) →
(j + 1, k− 1) for j ≥ k. In the rate equation approxima-
tion, the densities ck(t) now evolve according to
dck
dt
= ck−1
k−1∑
j=1
cj + ck+1
∞∑
j=k+1
cj − ckN − c2k. (12)
The first two terms account for the gain in ck(t) due to
the interaction between pairs of individuals of capitals
(j, k − 1), with j < k and (j, k + 1) with j > k, respec-
tively. The last two terms correspondingly account for
the loss of ck(t). One can check that the wealth density
M1 ≡
∑
∞
k=1 k ck(t) is conserved and that the population
density obeys
dN
dt
= −c1N. (13)
Eqs. (12) are conceptually similar to the Smoluchowski
equations for aggregation with a constant reaction rate
[10]. Mathematically, however, they appear to be more
complex and we have been unable to solve them ana-
lytically. Fortunately, Eq. (12) is amenable to a scaling
solution [11]. For this purpose, we first re-write Eq. (12)
as
dck
dt
= − ck(ck + ck+1) +N(ck−1 − ck)
+ (ck+1 − ck−1)
∞∑
j=k
cj . (14)
Taking the continuum limit and substituting the scaling
ansatz
ck(t) ≃ N2C(x), with x = kN, (15)
transforms Eqs. (13) and (14) to
dN
dt
= −C(0)N3, (16)
and
C(0)[2C + xC′] = 2C2 + C′
[
1− 2
∫
∞
x
dyC(y)
]
, (17)
where C′ = dC/dx. Note also that the scaling function
must obey the integral relations
∫
∞
0
dx C(x) = 1, and
∫
∞
0
dxx C(x) = 1. (18)
The former follows from the definition of the density,
N =
∑
ck(t) ≃ N
∫
dx C(x), while the latter follows if
we set, without loss of generality, the (conserved) wealth
density equal to unity,
∑
k kck(t) = 1.
Introducing B(x) = ∫ x0 dy C(y) recasts Eq. (17) into
C(0)[2B′ + xB′′] = 2B′2 + B′′[2B − 1]. Integrating twice
gives [C(0)x− B][B − 1] = 0, with solution B(x) = C(0)x
for x < xf and B(x) = 1 for x ≥ xf , from which we con-
clude that the scaled wealth distribution C(x) = B′(x)
coincides with the zero-temperature Fermi distribution;
C(x) =
{ C(0), x < xf ;
0, x ≥ xf . (19)
Hence the scaled profile has a sharp front at x = xf ,
with xf = 1/C(0) found by matching the two branches
of the solution for B(x). Making use of the second in-
tegral relation (18) gives C(0) = 1/2 and thereby closes
the solution. Thus the unscaled wealth distribution ck(t)
reads
ck(t) =
{
1/(2t), k < 2
√
t;
0, k ≥ 2√t; (20)
and the total density is N(t) = t−1/2.
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
x=kN
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
C(
x)
FIG. 1. Simulation results for the wealth distribution in
greedy additive exchange based on 2500 configurations for
106 traders. Shown are the scaled distributions C(x) versus
x = kN for t = 1.5n, with n = 18, 24, 30, and 36; these
steepen with increasing time. Each data set has been av-
eraged over a range of ≈ 3% of the data points to reduce
fluctuations.
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We checked these predictions by numerical simulations
(Fig. 1). In the simulation, two individuals are randomly
chosen to undergo greedy exchange and this process is
repeated. When an individual reaches zero capital he is
eliminated from the system, and the number of active
traders is reduced by one. After each reaction, the time
is incremented by the inverse of the number of active
traders. While the mean-field predictions are substan-
tially corroborated, the scaled wealth distribution for fi-
nite time actually resembles a finite-temperature Fermi
distribution (Fig. 1). As time increases, the wealth dis-
tribution becomes sharper and approaches Eq. (20). In
analogy with the Fermi distribution, the relative width
of the front may be viewed as an effective temperature.
Thus the wealth distribution is characterized by two
scales; one of order
√
t characterizes the typical wealth
of active traders and a second, smaller scale which char-
acterizes the width of the front [12].
To quantify the spreading of the front, let us include
the next corrections in the continuum limit of the rate
equations, Eq. (14). This gives,
∂c
∂t
= 2
∂
∂k
[
c
∫
∞
k
dj c(j)
]
− c ∂c
∂k
−N ∂c
∂k
+
N
2
∂2c
∂k2
. (21)
Here the second and fourth terms on the right-hand side
represent the next corrections. Since the “convective”
(third) term determines the location of the front to be
at kf = 2
√
t, it is natural to expect that the (diffusive)
fourth term describes the spreading of the front. The
term c ∂c∂k turns out to be negligible in comparison to the
diffusive spreading term and is henceforth neglected.
The dominant convective term can be removed by
transforming to a frame of reference which moves with
the front, namely, k → K = k−2√t. Among the remain-
ing terms in the transformed rate equation, the width of
the front regionW can now be determined by demanding
that the diffusion term has the same order of magnitude
as the reactive terms, that is, N ∂
2c
∂k2 ∼ c2. This implies
W ∼√N/c. Combining this withN = t−1/2 and c ∼ t−1
gives W ∼ t1/4, or a relative width w = W/kf ∼ t−1/4.
This suggests the appropriate scaling ansatz for the front
region is
ck(t) =
1
t
X(ξ), ξ =
k − 2√t
t1/4
. (22)
Substituting this ansatz into Eq. (21) gives a non-linear
single variable integro-differential equation for the scaling
function X(ξ). Together with the appropriate boundary
conditions, this represents, in principle, a more complete
solution to the wealth distribution. However, the essen-
tial scaling behavior of the finite-time spreading of the
front is already described by Eq. (22), so that solving for
X(ξ) itself does not provide additional scaling informa-
tion. Analysis of our data by several rudimentary ap-
proaches gives w ∼ t−α with α ≈ 1/5. We attribute
this discrepancy to the fact that w is obtained by differ-
entiating C(x), an operation which generally leads to an
increase in numerical errors.
C. Very Greedy Exchange
We now consider the variation in which events occur
at a rate equal to the difference in capital of the two
traders. That is, an individual is more likely to take cap-
ital from a much poorer person rather than from someone
of slightly less wealth. For this “very greedy” exchange,
the corresponding rate equations are
dck
dt
= ck−1
k−1∑
j=1
(k − 1− j)cj + ck+1
∞∑
j=k+1
(j − k − 1)cj
− ck
∞∑
j=1
|k − j|cj , (23)
while the total density obeys
dN
dt
= −c1(1−N), (24)
under the assumption that the (conserved) total wealth
density is set equal to one,
∑
kck = 1.
These rate equations can be solved by again applying
scaling. For this purpose, it is first expedient to rewrite
the rate equations as
dck
dt
= (ck−1 − ck)
k−1∑
j=1
(k − j)cj − ck−1
k−1∑
j=1
cj (25)
+ (ck+1 − ck)
∞∑
j=k+1
(j − k)cj − ck+1
∞∑
j=k+1
cj .
Taking the continuum limit gives
∂c
∂t
=
∂c
∂k
−N ∂
∂k
(kc). (26)
We now substitute the scaling ansatz, Eq. (15), to yield
C(0)[2C + xC′] = (x − 1)C′ + C, (27)
and
dN
dt
= −C(0)N2. (28)
Solving the above equations gives N ≃ [C(0)t]−1 and
C(x) = (1 + µ)(1 + µx)−2−1/µ, (29)
with µ = C(0) − 1. It may readily be verified that this
expression for C(x) satisfies both integral relations of
Eq. (18). The scaling approach has thus found a family
of solutions which are parameterized by µ, and additional
information is needed to determine which of these solu-
tions is appropriate for our system. For this purpose,
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note that Eq. (29) exhibits different behaviors depend-
ing on the sign of µ. When µ > 0, there is an extended
non-universal power-law distribution, while for µ = 0 the
solution is the pure exponential, C(x) = e−x. These so-
lutions may be rejected because the wealth distribution
cannot extend over an unbounded domain if the initial
wealth extends over a finite range.
The accessible solutions therefore correspond to −1 <
µ < 0, where the distribution is compact and finite, with
C(x) ≡ 0 for x ≥ xf = −µ−1. To determine the true so-
lution, let us re-examine the continuum form of the rate
equation, Eq. (26). From naive power counting, the first
two terms are asymptotically dominant and they give
a propagating front with kf exactly equal to t. Conse-
quently, the scaled location of the front is given by xf =
Nkf . Now the result N ≃ [C(0)t]−1 gives xf = 1/C(0).
Comparing this expression with the corresponding value
from the scaling approach, xf = [1− C(0)]−1, selects the
value C(0) = 1/2. Remarkably, this scaling solution co-
incides with the Fermi distribution that found for the
case of constant interaction rate. Finally, in terms of the
unscaled variables k and t, the wealth distribution is
ck(t) =
{
4/t2, k < t;
0, k ≥ t. (30)
Following the same reasoning as the previous section, this
discontinuity is smoothed out by diffusive spreading.
Another interesting feature is that if the interaction
rate is sufficiently greedy, “gelation” occurs [13], whereby
a finite fraction of the total capital is possessed by a single
individual. For interaction rates, or kernels K(j, k) be-
tween individuals of capital j and k which do not give rise
to gelation, the total density typically varies as a power
law in time, while for gelling kernels N(t) goes to zero at
some finite time. At the border between these regimes
N(t) typically decays exponentially in time [11,13]. We
seek a similar transition in behavior for the capital ex-
change model by considering the rate equation for the
density
dN
dt
= −c1
∞∑
k=1
K(1, k)ck. (31)
For the family of kernels with K(1, k) ∼ kν as k → ∞,
substitution of the scaling ansatz gives N˙ ∼ −N3−ν.
Thus N(t) exhibits a power-law behavior N ∼ t1/(2−ν)
for ν < 2 and an exponential behavior for ν = 2. Thus
gelation should arise for ν > 2.
III. MULTIPLICATIVE CAPITAL EXCHANGE
We have thus far focused on additive processes in which
the amount of capital transferred in a two-body inter-
action is fixed. This leads to the unrealistic feature of
a vanishing density of active traders in the long time
limit, as an individual who possesses the minimal amount
of capital loses all assets in an unfavorable interaction.
In many economic transactions, however, the amount of
capital transferred is a finite fraction of the initial capi-
tal of one of the participants. This observation motivates
us to consider capital exchange models with exactly this
multiplicative property. A simple realization which pre-
serves both the number of participants and the total cap-
ital is the reaction scheme (x, y)→ (x−αx, y+αx). Here
0 < α < 1 represents the fraction of loser’s capital which
is gained by the winner. In this process, the capital of
any individual remains non-zero, although it can become
vanishingly small.
In the following, we consider the cases of random ex-
change, where the winner may equally likely be the richer
or the poorer of the two traders, and greedy exchange,
where only the richer of the two traders profits in the in-
teraction. The former system quickly reaches a steady
state, while the latter gives rise to a non-stationary
power-law distribution of wealth.
A. Random Exchange
To determine the rate equation for random multiplica-
tive exchange, it is expedient to first write an integral
form of the equation, for which the origin of the various
terms is clear. This rate equation is
∂c(x)
∂t
=
1
2
∫ ∫
dy dz c(y)c(z)× [−δ(x− z)− δ(x− y)
+δ(y(1− α)− x) + δ(z + αy − x)]. (32)
The first two terms account for the loss of c(x) due to
the interaction of an individual of capital x. The next
term accounts for the gain in c(x) by the losing interac-
tion (x/(1− α), y)→ (x, y + αx/(1− α)). The last term
also accounts for gain in c(x) by the profitable interac-
tion (y, x− αy)→ (y(1− α), x). By integrating over the
delta functions, this rate equation reduces to
∂c(x)
∂t
= −c(x) + 1
2(1− α) c
(
x
1− α
)
+
1
2α
∫ x
0
dy c(y) c
(
x− y
α
)
, (33)
where the total density is set equal to one. In this form,
the rate equation describes a diffusive-like process on a
logarithmic scale, except that the (third) term, which de-
scribes hopping to the right, is non-local and two-body
in character.
To help understand the nature of the resulting wealth
distribution, let us first consider the moments, Mn(t) ≡∫
∞
0 dxx
nc(x, t). From Eq. (33) one can straightforwardly
verify that the first two moments, M0 and M1, the
population and wealth densities, respectively, are con-
served. Without loss of generality, we choose M0 = 1
and M1 = M . The equation of motion for the second
moment is
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dM2(t)
dt
= −α(1− α)M2(t) + αM2 (34)
with solution
M2(t) =
M2
1− α +
[
M2(0)− M
2
1− α
]
e−α(1−α)t. (35)
Similarly, higher moments also exhibit exponential con-
vergence to constant values, so that the wealth distribu-
tion approaches a steady state. The mechanism for this
steady state is simply that the typical size of a profitable
interaction is likely to be much smaller than an unprof-
itable interaction for a rich individual, while the opposite
holds for a poor individual. This bias prevents the un-
limited spread of the wealth distribution and stabilizes a
steady state.
To determine the steady state wealth distribution, we
substitute simple “test” solutions into the rate equa-
tions. By this approach, we find that the exponential
form c(x) = Be−bx satisfies the steady-state version of
the rate equation, Eq. (33), iff α = 12 and B = b. Thus
when the winner receives one half the capital of the loser,
the exact steady wealth distribution is a simple exponen-
tial c(x) = M−1 exp(−x/M). For general 0 < α < 1, the
large-α tail is again an exponential, c(x) ≃ 2b(1−α)e−bx.
However, for x≪ 1, we find, by substitution and apply-
ing dominant balance, that c(x) ∼ xλ is the asymptotic
solution, with exponent λ = −1− ln 2/ ln(1 − α).
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
x
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
c(x
)
FIG. 2. Representative results for the wealth distribution
in random multiplicative exchange for the case α = 0.25 based
on simulation of 10 configurations of 105 traders. Shown
are the steady-state wealth distributions c(x) as a function
of wealth x for t = 1.5n, with n = 6, 8, 10, and 12. The
various curves are indistinguishable. The predicted x1.409...
small-x tail is not resolvable because of the coarseness of the
data binning.
Interestingly, λ is positive when α < 1/2, so that the
density of the poor is vanishingly small. A heuristic jus-
tification for this phenomenon is that for α < 1/2 an
unfavorable interaction leads to a relatively small capi-
tal loss, and this loss is more than compensated for by
favorable interactions so that a poor individual has the
possibility of climbing out of poverty. In the opposite case
of α > 1/2, unprofitable interactions are sufficiently dev-
astating that a large and persistent underclass is formed,
with a power-law divergence in the number of poor in the
limit of vanishing wealth.
Our simulations substantially confirm these results
(Fig. 2). The scope of the simulations is less than that in
additive processes, since the number of traders remains
fixed, so that CPU time scales linearly in the simulation
time. In contrast, for additive exchange, the CPU time
scale as
∫ t
dt′N(t′), which can be much smaller than t.
Numerically, we find that the moments Mn(t) quickly
converge to equilibrium values. The resulting wealth dis-
tribution is clearly a simple exponential for α = 1/2 and
exhibits either a power-law divergence or a power-law
zero as x → 0 for α > 1/2 and α < 1/2, respectively, in
agreement with our analytical results.
B. Greedy Exchange
Parallel to our discussion of additive processes, we now
investigate greedy multiplicative exchange, where only
the richer trader profits, as represented by the reaction
(x, y)→ (x− αx, y + αx) for x < y. Following the same
reasoning as that used in the previous subsection, the
rate equation for greedy multiplicative exchange is
∂c(x)
∂t
= −c(x) + 1
1− α c
(
x
1− α
)
N
(
x
1− α
)
+
1
α
∫ x
x/(1+α)
dy c(y) c
(
x− y
α
)
, (36)
whereN(x) =
∫
∞
x
dz c(z) is the population density whose
wealth exceeds x.
Numerical simulations of this system show that the
wealth distribution evolves ad infinitum and that the
most of the population eventually becomes impoverished
(Fig. 3). Note that the discreteness of our linear data
binning lumps the poorest into a single bin at the ori-
gin which is not visible on the double logarithmic scale.
The pervasive impoverishment arises because greedy ex-
change causes the poor to become poorer and the rich
to become richer, but wealth conservation implies that
there must be many more poor than rich individuals. In
the long-time limit therefore, a small fraction of the pop-
ulation possesses most of the wealth.
To understand these features analytically, first consider
the extreme case of α = 1 which reduces to classical con-
stant kernel aggregation [10], except for the added fea-
ture that individuals of zero wealth are now included in
the distribution. Consequently, the scaling form of the
wealth distribution in the long time limit is
c(x, t) ≃ t−2e−x/t + (1− t−1)δ(x). (37)
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The first term is just the scaling solution to constant-
kernel aggregation [10], so that the delta function term
represents the population with zero wealth.
100 101 102 103 104 105
x
100
101
102
103
104
105
c(x
)
FIG. 3. The unnormalized wealth distribution in greedy
multiplicative exchange for the case α = 0.5 based on simu-
lation of 10 configurations of 105 traders. Shown on a double
logarithmic scale are the wealth distributions c(x) as a func-
tion of wealth x for t = 1.5n, with n = 7, 10, 13, and 16.
For general 0 < α < 1 a qualitatively related distribu-
tion can be anticipated which consists of a large impov-
erished class of negligible wealth and a much smaller and
widely distributed population of wealthy. To determine
this distribution, it is expedient to re-write Eq. (36) as
∂c(x)
∂t
=
∫ x/(1+α)
0
dz c(z) [c(x− αz)− c(x)] (38)
−c(x)N
(
x
1 + α
)
+
1
1− α c
(
x
1− α
)
N
(
x
1− α
)
.
Since Fig. 3 indicates that the wealth distribution is a
power law, we substitute such a form in Eq. (38) and
find that
c(x, t) =
A
xt
, A = − 1
ln(1− α) (39)
is a solution. However, this exact form cannot be real-
ized starting from any initial condition. Thus Eq. (39)
should be regarded as an attractor for the family of so-
lutions to Eq. (38) which begin from a specified initial
condition. Another pathology of Eq. (39) is that all mo-
ments,Mn(t) =
∫
∞
0 dxx
nc(x, t), are divergent. Note also
that the last two terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (38)
diverge (although their difference is regularized to the fi-
nite value A
2
xt2 ln
1+α
1−α ). These observations suggest that
a true solution to Eq. (38) converges to Eq. (39) only in
the scaling region x1(t) < x < x2(t), while a true solution
has not yet had time to extend outside this domain.
To estimate these cutoffs for the scaling region, we eval-
uate the moments
M0(t) ∼
∫ x2
x1
dx c(x, t) ∼ A ln(x2/x1)
t
M1(t) ∼
∫ x2
x1
dxxc(x, t) ∼ Ax2
t
(40)
Since M0 = 1 and M1 =M are constant, one obtains
x1(t) ∼ e−t/A = (1− α)t, x2(t) ∝ t. (41)
The factor x1(t) clearly gives the wealth of the poorest
at time t. Since a losing interaction leads to a reduction
of capital by the factor (1 − α), the poorest individual
at time t will have capital (1− α)t for the monodisperse
initial condition, c0(x) = δ(x − 1), and a constant reac-
tion rate. To understand the upper cutoff, suppose that
x ≫ t. In this case, the last two terms on the right-
hand side of (38) are negligible. In the remaining term,
the expression in the square brackets may be replaced by
αz ∂c(x,t)∂x , so that the resulting integral is simply equal to
M . With these simplifications, the rate equation reduces
to ct + αMcx = 0. This linear wave equation admits the
general solution c(x, t) = c0(x − αMt) and suggests the
upper cutoff x2(t) ≃ αMt, consistent with Eq. (41).
10-1 100 101 102 103
time
100
101
102
103
(M
n
)1/(
n-1
)
FIG. 4. The reduced moments M
1/(n−1)
n versus time for
greedy multiplicative exchange for the case α = 0.5 based on
simulation of 10 configurations of 105 traders. These reduced
moments are predicted to increase linearly in time (see text).
Note, however, that there is inconsistency in our rea-
soning, as starting with the assumption x ≫ t leads to
an upper cutoff of order t. In spite of this logical short-
coming, we have verified many of the resulting quanti-
tative characteristics. For example, numerical simula-
tion clearly yields the 1/x power-law tail of the wealth
distribution. Furthermore, if one defines the wealthy
as those whose capital exceeds some threshold ǫ, then
Eqs. (39) and (41) give the density of wealthy propor-
tional to ln(t/ǫ)/t. It is in this sense that we can view
7
the wealth distribution as consisting of two components:
the wealthy density which is proportional to ln(t/ǫ)/t and
a complementary density of the poor. Using Eq. (39) one
can also readily determine the behavior of the moments
to be Mn(t) ∼ t−1
∫ t
0 dxx
n−1 ∼ tn−1, for n > 1, or
equivalently M
1/(n−1)
n should grow linearly with time, as
is observed in our simulations (Fig. 4). Least-square fits
to the data with the first few data points deleted clearly
indicate a growth rate which is very nearly linear.
IV. ARBITRARY SPATIAL DIMENSION
We now consider the role of spatial dimensionality on
the asymptotic wealth distribution in additive exchange
processes. While the rate equations apply for perfectly
mixed traders or for diffusing traders in infinite spatial
dimension, d = ∞, deviations from the resulting mean-
field predictions are expected when d is below an upper
critical dimension dc. In arbitrary spatial dimension, we
assume that an interaction occurs whenever two diffusing
individuals meet. This transport mechanism should not
be interpreted as diffusion in real space, but rather in a
space of economic activity. For example, if economic ac-
tivity were confined to a one-dimensional road, we would
use d = 1. More generally, an economic network may
have an effective dimension d > 1, with d → ∞ in the
modern global economy.
We further make the simplifying assumption that the
diffusivity is independent of an individual’s capital. Then
an interaction occurs when N ·N ≈ 1, where N (τ) is the
average number of distinct sites visited by a random walk
in a time interval τ . This quantity scales as [7]
N (τ) ∼


τd/2, d < 2;
τ/ ln τ, d = 2;
τ, d > 2;
(42)
as τ →∞ and thus gives the following estimates for the
density dependence of the time interval between events
τ ∼


N−2/d, d < 2;
N−1 ln(1/N), d = 2;
N−1, d > 2.
(43)
Since the total density decreases only in events which
involve the poorest individuals, we have
dN
dt
∼ −c1
τ
(44)
Since we already know how the collision time τ depends
on N , we need to express c1 on N to solve Eq. (44) and
complete the solution.
For random exchange, rate equations similar to Eq. (1)
should apply, except for the obvious change of the colli-
sion rate N by the dimension-dependent rate τ−1 from
Eq. (43). Thus introducing the modified time variable
T =
∫ t
0
dt′
τ(t′)
(45)
reduces the governing equations to the pure diffusion
equation, as in Sec. II. Combining Eqs. (7), (43), and
(45), we find
N(t) ∼


t−d/2(d+1), d < 2;
(t/ ln t)−1/3, d = 2;
t−1/3, d > 2.
(46)
The wealth distribution is given by ck(t) ∼ N2x e−x2
with N(t) given by Eq. (46). In particular, the density
of the poorest individuals is proportional to N3.
For greedy exchange in d < 2, we assume that the scal-
ing ansatz, Eq. (15), still applies, but with the slightly
stronger addition condition C(0) > 0. This immediately
gives c1 ∼ N2. Using this result, together with Eq. (43)
in Eq. (44), gives
N ∼


t−d/(d+2), d < 2;
(t/ ln t)−1/2, d = 2;
t−1/2, d > 2.
(47)
Our results for N(t) given in Eqs. (46) and (47) also
indicate that dc = 2 is the upper critical dimension for
additive capital exchange since it demarcates dimension-
independent and dimension-dependent kinetics.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have investigated the dynamical behavior of wealth
distributions in simple capital exchange models. For ad-
ditive processes, the amount of capital exchanged in all
transactions is fixed, with the sense of the exchange be-
ing either random – “random” exchange – or favoring
the rich – “greedy” exchange. The former leads to a
Gaussian wealth distribution, while the latter gives rise
to a Fermi-like distribution. In both cases, the number of
economically viable individuals decays as a power law in
time and their average wealth correspondingly increases.
A “very greedy” process was also introduced in which
the trading rate between two individuals is an increasing
function of their capital difference. This case also gives
rise to a Fermi-like wealth distribution, but with a faster
decay in the density of active traders and a concomitant
faster growth in their wealth.
We next considered multiplicative processes in which
a finite fraction of the capital of one of the traders is ex-
changed in a transaction, namely, (x, y) → (x − αx, y +
αx). From our naive viewpoint, this multiplicative rule,
especially for relatively small α, appears to provide a
plausible description of real economic transactions. This
process gives rise to non-local rate equations which we
have been unable to solve in closed form. Nevertheless,
considerable insight was gained by analysis of the mo-
ments and asymptotics of the wealth distribution. For
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random exchange, the basic interaction biases individu-
als with extreme wealth or extreme poverty towards the
center of the distribution and a steady state is quickly
reached. The large wealth tail of the distribution is ex-
ponential, while at small wealth there is a power-law tail
which may be either divergent of vanishing, for α > 1/2
or α < 1/2, respectively.
For greedy exchange, the wealth distribution assumes
a power law form c(x, t) ≃ 1/(xt) for wealth in the range
(1 − α)t < x < t. The two cutoffs correspond to the
wealth levels of the poorest and richest individuals, lev-
els which continue to evolve with time. This evolving
power law form conforms to our uninformed view of the
wealth distribution in certain countries with developing
economies. If we define the rich as those whose capital
is greater than the average initial capital, their fraction
decays as ln t/t and their average wealth grows as t/ ln t
Formally, it would be interesting to investigate limiting
situations where well-known pathologies in the underly-
ing capital exchange process can occur. For example,
as briefly mentioned in Sec. II, there is the possibility
of one individual acquiring a finite fraction of the total
capital in a finite time. This feature corresponds to gela-
tion in polymerization processes [13]. Mathematically,
this singularity should manifest itself in the violation of
wealth conservation, where the loss of wealth in the pop-
ulation of finitely wealthy individuals signals the appear-
ance of an infinitely rich individual. For multiplicative
exchange processes which possess two conservation laws
– total density and wealth – there is also the possibil-
ity of losing population of individuals of finite wealth
to a “dust” phase which consists of a finite fraction of
all individuals who possess no wealth. This latter phe-
nomenon is analogous to the “shattering” transition in
fragmentation processes [14].
At a practical level, a potentially fruitful direction
would be to incorporate additional realistic elements into
capital exchange models. For example, in all societies,
there is some form of wealth redistribution by taxation.
It would be worthwhile to determine how various types
of taxation algorithms – graduated tax, “flat” tax, etc.,
in concert with capital exchange – influence the asymp-
totic wealth distribution. Conversely, it would be inter-
esting to understand how financial “safety nets”, such as
welfare, affect the density and wealth of the poorest indi-
viduals. Another aspect worth pursuing is heterogeneous
exchange rules, where the factor α is either different for
each individual or depends on some other aspect of a
trading event. One might hope to find universality in
the wealth distributions with respect to this heterogene-
ity.
More generally, the focus on conserved exchange of
capital is deficient because there is no mechanism for eco-
nomic growth. Pure exchange might be appropriate for
short time scales during which economic growth is negli-
gible. However, pure exchange cannot be expected to be
suitable on longer time scales where long-term economic
growth is an overriding influence. Thus a two-body in-
teraction rule with a net increase in the capital might be
a more appropriate long-time description of an economi-
cally interacting system.
Perhaps the simplest realization is random capital
growth, (j, k)→ (j + 1, k) or (j, k + 1). Within the rate
equation approach, this model is readily solved to find the
asymptotic wealth distribution ck(t) ∼ t−1/2 exp[−(t −
k)2/2t]. Hence the average wealth grows linearly in time,
〈k〉 ≃ t, while the relative fluctuation √〈(∆k)2〉/〈k〉 de-
creases as t−1/2. Thus an (economically) fair society with
a sharp wealth distribution arises, albeit with an unrealis-
tic linear, rather than exponential, growth of the average
wealth. Such an exponential growth can be achieved,
e. g., by an interaction rate which equals the sum of
capitals of the participants, K(i, j) = i + j. the total
wealth density M =
∑
kck now obeys M˙ = 2NM and
thus grows exponentially. This model fulfills the Marxist
dream of fast wealth growth 〈k〉 ∼ e2Nt with all partici-
pating equally in the prosperity (the relative fluctuation
decreasing as
√
t e−Nt). For an interaction rate which in-
creases even more rapidly with wealth, there is a pathol-
ogy analogous to gelation – infinite prosperity in a finite
time. For example, for the product kernel, K(i, j) = ij,
the wealth distribution for a monodisperse initial con-
dition is ck(t) = (1 − t)tk−1. Interestingly, the Marx-
ist ideal lies on the boundary between algebraic wealth
growth and the pathology of a finite-time wealth diver-
gence, a feature similar to the “life on the edge of chaos”
advocated by Kauffman as a generic property of complex
systems [3].
Related behavior occurs in a multiplicative growth
process where (x, y) → (x, y + αx). Naively, a sin-
gle multiplicative interaction which changes the capi-
tal by an amount proportional to the existing capital
k is roughly equivalent to k successive additive interac-
tions. Consequently, this simple version of multiplica-
tive growth should exhibit exponential wealth growth.
For the specific case that we were able to solve, α =
1, the wealth distribution approaches the scaling form
ck(t) ∼ e−t exp(−xe−t). However, the wealth distribu-
tion is broad, a feature generic of multiplicative growth
processes for general values of α.
More realistically, an overall growth process should
incorporate the possibility that in a single trade: both
traders profit, one profits, or neither profits, but with an
overall gain in capital when averaged over many trading
events. It would be interesting to determine the nature of
the wealth distribution in such a multiplicative system.
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